

accomplishment of the modification of the nacelle strut and wing structure required by this paragraph.

(1) Prior to the accumulation of 37,500 total flight cycles, or prior to 20 years since the date of manufacture of the airplane, whichever occurs first.

(2) Within 3,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD.

#### Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

**Note 2:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

#### Special Flight Permits

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 16, 1999.

**D.L. Riggins,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 99-21685 Filed 8-19-99; 8:45 am]

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## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-NM-156-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 series airplanes. This proposal would require a visual inspection of the PS wire bundle, shielded wires going to fuel probe "G," and any other wire or wire bundle for chafing in the forward wing spar and forward ventral tank area; and corrective actions, if necessary. This proposal is prompted by reports indicating that, due to improper routing of a wire bundle, the wire bundle chafed

against the forward ventral tank transfer/crossfeed valve, which caused an electrical short and resulted in failure of the landing light. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent a short circuit due to wire chafing, which can cause a fire in the ventral fuel tank area.

**DATES:** Comments must be received by October 4, 1999.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-156-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Raytheon Aircraft Company, Manager Service Engineering, Hawker Customer Support Department, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201-0085. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Philip Petty, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Propulsion Branch, ACE-116W, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone (316) 946-4139; fax (316) 946-4407.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 99-NM-156-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

#### Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-156-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

#### Discussion

The FAA has received reports of a wire bundle chafing against the forward ventral tank transfer/crossfeed valve on Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 series airplanes. The wire insulation had worn through and caused an electrical short, which resulted in failure of the landing light. The cause of such chafing has been attributed to improper routing of the PS wire bundle at fuselage station 293.47 during production, which may allow the wire bundle to contact the forward ventral tank transfer/crossfeed valve. This condition, if not corrected, could result in an electrical short, which could cause a fire in the ventral fuel tank area.

#### Explanation of Relevant Service Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved Raytheon Aircraft Service Bulletin SB 24-3201, dated October 1998. The service bulletin describes procedures for a detailed visual inspection of the PS wire bundle, shielded wires going to fuel probe "G," and any other wire or wire bundle for chafing in the forward wing spar and forward ventral tank area; and corrective action, if necessary. The corrective actions involve ensuring adequate clearance between the PS wire bundle and the front ventral tank transfer/crossfeed valve actuator; and between the shielded wires going to fuel probe "G" and the wing transfer valve actuator; installing spiral wrap; repairing chafed wire; and replacing chafed wire with new wire. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

## Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously, except as discussed below.

## Differences Between Proposed Rule and Service Bulletin

Operators should note that, although the service bulletin specifies that the manufacturer may be contacted for disposition of certain repair conditions, this proposal would require the repair of those conditions to be accomplished in accordance with a method approved by the FAA.

## Cost Impact

There are approximately 91 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 39 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$2,340, or \$60 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

## Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

## List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

## The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

## PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

#### **Raytheon Aircraft Company (Formerly Beech):** Docket 99–NM–156–AD.

Applicability: Model Hawker 1000 series airplanes, serial numbers 258151, 258159, and 259003 through 259052 inclusive, certificated in any category.

**Note 1:** This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

**Compliance:** Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent a short circuit due to wire chafing, which can cause a fire in the ventral fuel tank area, accomplish the following:

#### **Inspection and Modification**

(a) Within 50 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, perform a detailed visual inspection of the PS wire bundle coming from the bung 'DF' for chafing against the front ventral tank transfer/crossfeed actuator, in accordance with Raytheon Aircraft Service Bulletin SB 24–3201, dated October 1998.

**Note 2:** For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: "An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally

supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required."

(1) If no chafing is found, prior to further flight, ensure a minimum 0.25-inch clearance exists between the PS wire bundle and valve actuator; and install spiral wrap, as necessary; in accordance with the service bulletin.

(2) If any chafing is found on a 22, 20, 16, or 14 gauge (non-shielded) wire, prior to further flight, repair chafed wire by splicing the damaged section using MIL-S-81824/1 splices; ensure a minimum 0.25-inch clearance exists between the wire bundle and valve actuator; and install spiral wrap, as necessary; in accordance with the service bulletin.

(3) If any chafing is found on a 10 gauge wire, replace the entire wire with a new 10 gauge wire; ensure a minimum 0.25-inch clearance exists between the wire bundle and valve actuator; and install spiral wrap, as necessary; in accordance with the service bulletin.

(b) Within 50 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, perform a detailed visual inspection of the shielded wires going to the fuel probe "G" for chafing against the wing transfer valve actuator and mounting screws, in accordance with Raytheon Aircraft Service Bulletin SB 24–3201, dated October 1998.

(1) If no chafing is found, prior to further flight, ensure a minimum 0.25-inch clearance exists between the wire bundle and valve actuator; and install spiral wrap, as necessary; in accordance with the service bulletin.

(2) If any chafing is found, prior to further flight, replace the entire shielded wire with a new shielded wire; ensure a minimum 0.25-inch clearance exists between the wire bundle and valve actuator; and install spiral wrap, as necessary; in accordance with the service bulletin.

(c) Within 50 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, perform a borescope inspection of the entire forward wing spar/forward ventral tank area for chafing of any other wire or wire bundle; and install spiral wrap, as necessary; in accordance with Raytheon Aircraft Service Bulletin SB 24–3201, dated October 1998.

(1) If no chafing is found, no further action is required by this AD.

(2) If any chafed wire or wire bundle is found, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. For a repair method to be approved by the Manager, Wichita ACO, as required by this paragraph, the Manager's approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

#### **Alternative Methods of Compliance**

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Wichita ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add

comments and then send it to the Manager, Wichita ACO.

**Note 3:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Wichita ACO.

#### Special Flight Permits

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 16, 1999.

**D.L. Riggins,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 99-21684 Filed 8-19-99; 8:45 am]

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## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-NM-181-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330 and A340 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. This proposal would require a one-time inspection of the rail release pins and parachute pins of the escape slide/raft pack assembly for correct installation, and corrective actions, if necessary. This proposal is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent improper deployment of the escape slide/raft and blockage of the door in the event of an emergency evacuation.

**DATES:** Comments must be received by September 20, 1999.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-181-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Airbus Industrie, Customer Services Directorate, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Norman B. Martenson, Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2110; fax (425) 227-1149.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 99-NM-181-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

##### Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-181-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

##### Discussion

The Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the airworthiness authority for France, has notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on certain Airbus

Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. The DGAC advises that cases of improper escape slide/raft deployment have been reported. One operator reported the escape slide/raft failed to deploy and the passenger/crew door was blocked part way open. Subsequent investigation revealed that the cause of this deployment failure and door blockage was incorrect installation of the rail release pins of the escape slide/raft pack assembly. Another operator reported that, after deployment of the escape slide/raft, the packboard of the escape slide/raft caught on the aft edge of the door, obstructing the escape path, instead of falling out of the airplane in a normal deployment. Investigation revealed that the obstruction of the escape path by the packboard of the escape slide/raft occurred because the parachute pin of the escape slide/raft assembly was already pulled out before the door was open. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in improper deployment of the escape slide/raft and blockage of the door in the event of an emergency evacuation.

##### Explanation of Relevant Service Information

Airbus Industrie has issued Service Bulletins A330-25-3086 (for Model A330 series airplanes) and A340-25-4115 (for Model A340 series airplanes), both Revision 01, dated June 11, 1999; which describe procedures for a one-time inspection of the rail release pins and parachute pins of the escape slide/raft pack assembly for correct installation, and corrective actions, if necessary. Corrective actions include re-installation of the rail release pin into the release rail; or, if either the rail release pin cannot be re-installed or the parachute pin is found incorrectly installed, corrective actions include removal of the discrepant escape slide/raft pack assembly and replacement with a new pack assembly of the same part number. The DGAC classified these service bulletins as mandatory and issued French airworthiness directives 1999-178-086(B) (for Model A330 series airplanes) and 1999-179-107(B) (for Model A340 series airplanes), both dated May 5, 1999; in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in France.

##### FAA's Conclusions

These airplane models are manufactured in France and are type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of § 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement,