

Pre-disaster Mitigation Loans

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Pre-disaster Mitigation Loans**§ 123.400 What is a pre-disaster mitigation loan?**

Congress has authorized a pilot program for 5 fiscal years from 2000 through 2004 for SBA to make low interest, fixed rate loans to small businesses to use mitigation measures in support of Project Impact, a formal mitigation program established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

§ 123.401 What types of mitigating measures are eligible for a pre-disaster mitigation loan?

Mitigation means specific measures taken by you to protect your real property or leasehold improvements from future disasters in Project Impact communities. If you are a landlord, the measures must be for protection of commercial rather than residential real property. Additionally, SBA will consider providing a pre-disaster mitigation loan for relocation if your commercial real property is located in a SFHA (Special Flood Hazard Area) and you relocate outside the SFHA but remain in the same Project Impact community. If the mitigation measures involved a flood hazard, the applicant small business must be located in an existing structure in a SFHA. The local Project Impact coordinator will confirm that your proposed project is in accordance with specific Project Impact priorities and goals of that community. SBA will verify each project to determine if the project will accomplish the desired mitigation results.

§ 123.402 Is my business eligible to apply for a pre-disaster mitigation loan?

Most small business concerns located in a FEMA Project Impact community are eligible to apply for a pre-disaster mitigation loan. Your small business

may be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity recognized under State law. Your small business must have been in existence for at least one year prior to submitting an application for this loan.

§ 123.403 When would my business not be eligible to apply for a pre-disaster mitigation loan?

Your business is not eligible for a pre-disaster mitigation loan if it fits into any of the categories in § 123.101, § 123.201, and § 123.301. Your business (together with its affiliates) must be small (as defined in part 121 of this chapter) and SBA must determine that the business and its owners do not have the financial resources to fund the mitigation measures without undue hardship.

§ 123.404 How much can my business borrow with a pre-disaster mitigation loan?

Pre-disaster mitigation loans are limited to \$50,000 for each borrower together with its affiliates. Program funds will be allocated on a first come, first served filing basis. SBA will consider mitigation measures in excess of \$50,000 if the business can show that the excess cost can be funded from other sources.

§ 123.405 What is the interest rate on a pre-disaster mitigation loan?

Your pre-disaster mitigation loan will have an interest rate of 4 percent per annum or less.

§ 123.406 How do I apply for a pre-disaster mitigation loan and which loans will be funded?

(a) Each State, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have at least one Project Impact community. Only those small businesses located in the Project Impact communities are eligible to apply for a pre-disaster mitigation loan. At the beginning of each fiscal year, SBA will publish a notice of the pre-disaster mitigation declaration in the **Federal Register** identifying the type of assistance available, the application filing deadline and locations for obtaining and filing loan applications. Additionally, SBA will use FEMA and the local media to inform potential loan applicants where to obtain loan applications. SBA will not accept any applications after the announced deadline unless SBA reopens the application filing period.

(b) Complete an SBA pre-disaster mitigation loan application package and attach a written statement from the local Project Impact coordinator that the project is in accordance with the specific priorities and goals of the local

community. SBA will have a 30-day application filing period of November 1 through November 30 of each fiscal year. Additional application periods may be announced each year depending on availability of funds.

(c) Upon acceptance of a completed application package by the SBA Disaster Area Office, that office will notify the Office of Disaster Assistance (ODA) of the acceptance. Each application will be processed (approval, decline, or withdrawal) by the Area Office and that office will notify ODA of the action. ODA will then notify each Area Office of which completed approval actions to fund based on the date the completed application package was received and availability of loan funds.

§ 123.407 What happens if my pre-disaster mitigation loan application is denied or withdrawn?

(a) If your loan application is denied refer to § 123.13. Additionally, if your application is accepted for reconsideration or appeal, SBA will reflect the date of reconsideration or appeal as the date the application was received.

(b) If your loan application is withdrawn, the date of reacceptance will be considered as the date the application was received.

Dated: June 29, 1999.

Aida Alvarez,
Administrator.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. 98-CE-87-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Precise Flight, Inc. Model SVS III Standby Vacuum Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to all U.S. owners and operators of aircraft equipped with Precise Flight, Inc. Model SVS III standby vacuum systems installed in accordance with the applicable supplemental type certificate (STC) or through field approval. The proposed AD would require

incorporating revised operating limitations for the affected standby vacuum systems into the airplane flight manual (AFM), and repetitively inspecting the push-pull cable, vacuum lines, saddle fittings, and shuttle valve for correct installation and damage (wear, chafing, deterioration, etc.). The proposed AD would also require immediately correcting any discrepancy found and conducting a function test of the vacuum system after the inspections. This AD results from reports of shuttle valve failure and standby vacuum system malfunction on aircraft. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to detect and correct problems with the standby vacuum system before failure or malfunction and to provide operating procedures for the pilot regarding the use and limitations of this system.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before August 30, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98-CE-87-AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments may be inspected at this location between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, holidays excepted.

Service information that applies to the proposed AD may be obtained from Precise Flight, Inc., 63120 Powell Butte Road, Bend, Oregon 97701; telephone: (800)-547-2558. This information also may be examined at the Rules Docket at the address above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Della Swartz, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW, Renton, Washington 98055-4065; telephone: (425) 227-2596; facsimile: (425) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. 98-CE-87-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98-CE-87-AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

Discussion

The FAA has received several reports of problems on aircraft equipped with Precise Flight, Inc. Model SVS III standby vacuum systems. In particular, the reports show 14 incidents of failed shuttle control valves and 2 accidents where improper use of the standby vacuum system was a factor. Other parts of the standby vacuum system that could fail include the saddle fittings, vacuum lines, and the push-pull cables.

The standby vacuum system is intended to provide emergency vacuum power for aircraft instruments when the primary vacuum system fails. The design of the Precise Flight, Inc. Model SVS III standby vacuum system is such that it may not be able to provide sufficient power to maintain altitude and operate the vacuum instruments.

Failure of the standby vacuum system in instrument flight rules (IFR) can lead to the pilot making incorrect decisions based on the data received from the instruments with consequent loss of control of the aircraft.

The Precise Flight, Inc. Model SVS III standby vacuum systems are installed on aircraft through a supplemental type certificate (STC) or through field approval. The Applicability section of the proposed AD lists the applicable STC's and aircraft that could have these standby vacuum systems installed. This list is not meant to be exhaustive nor does it include all aircraft with the systems installed through field approval.

Relevant Service Information

Precise Flight, Inc. has issued the following:

- Airplane Flight Manual Supplements (AFMS) for Standby Vacuum Systems (each document corresponds with the Applicable STC), which include operating procedures for the pilot regarding the use and limitations of the Model SVS III standby vacuum system; and
- Precise Flight Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (Section 3.3 of Installation Report No. 50050), Revision 25, dated August 26, 1996, which specifies procedures for inspecting the push-pull cables, vacuum lines, saddle fittings, and shuttle valve for correct installation and damage (wear, chafing, deterioration, etc.); immediately correcting any discrepancy found; and conducting a function test of the vacuum system after each inspection.

The FAA's Determination

After examining the circumstances and reviewing all available information related to the incidents described above, including the above-referenced service information, the FAA has determined that AD action should be taken to detect and correct problems with the standby vacuum system before failure or malfunction and to provide operating procedures for the pilot regarding the use and limitations of this system.

Explanation of the Provisions of the Proposed AD

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop in aircraft equipped with Precise Flight, Inc. Model SVC III standby vacuum systems, the FAA is proposing AD action. The proposed AD would require incorporating revised operating limitations for the affected standby vacuum systems into the airplane flight manual (AFM), and repetitively inspecting the push-pull cable, vacuum lines, saddle fittings, and shuttle valve for correct installation and damage (wear, chafing, deterioration, etc.). The proposed AD would also require immediately correcting any discrepancy found and conducting a function test of the vacuum system after each inspection.

Compliance Time of the Proposed AD

The compliance times of the proposed AD are presented in calendar time. Although malfunction or failure of the standby vacuum systems is only unsafe while the aircraft is in flight, the condition is not a direct result of repetitive aircraft operation. The unsafe

condition could exist on a standby vacuum system installed on an aircraft with only 50 hours time-in-service (TIS), but may not develop on another standby vacuum system installed on an aircraft until 1,000 hours TIS. The inspection compliance times are proposed to coincide with annual inspections so as to allow the owner/operator of the aircraft to have the proposed action accomplished at a time when he/she had already scheduled maintenance activities.

Cost Impact

The FAA estimates that 10,000 standby vacuum systems would be affected by the proposed AD, that it would take approximately 3 workhours per vacuum system to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is approximately \$60 an hour. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$1,800,000, or \$180 per airplane.

These figures only take into account the costs of the initial inspection and initial functional test of the standby vacuum systems; subsequent inspections and functional tests and any corrective actions are not included in the cost impact. The FAA has no way of determining the number of repetitive inspections and functional tests each airplane owner/operator will incur over

the life of an airplane incorporating one of the affected standby vacuum systems. The FAA also has no way of determining the number of standby vacuum systems that would require corrective action based on the inspection results.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action has been placed in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD) to read as follows:

Precise Flight, Inc.: Docket No. 98-CE-87-AD.

Applicability: Model SVS III standby vacuum systems, installed on, but not limited to, the aircraft listed in the following chart. These systems can be installed either in accordance with the applicable supplemental type certificate (STC) or through field approval:

Affected STC	Make and model airplanes
SA2160NM	Raytheon Beech Models 23, A23, A23A, A23-19, 19A, B19, B19A, A23-24, B23, C23, A24, A24R, B24R, C24R, 35, A35, B35, C35, D35, E35, F35, G35, 35R, H35, J35, K35, M35, N35, P35, S35, V35, V35A, V35B, 35-33, 35-A33, 35-B33, 35-C33, 35-C33A, E33, E33A, E33C, F33, F33A, F33C, G33, 36, A36, A36TC, B36TC, 4S(YT-34), A45(T-34A, B-45), D45(T-34B), and 77 Series.
SA2161NM	Raytheon Beech Model V35B.
SA2162NM	Cessna Models 120, 140, 140A, 150, 150A, 150B, 150C, 150D, 150E, 150F, 150G, 150H, 150J, 150K, 150L, A150L, 150M, 152, A152, A150K, A150M, 170, 170A, 170B, 172, 172A, 172B, 172C, 172D, 172E, 172F (USAFT-41A), 172G, 172H(USAFT-41A), 172I, 172K, 172L, 172M, 172N, 172P, 172Q, 175, 175A, 175B, 175C, P172D, R172E (USAFT-41B, USAFT41-3, and USAFT-41D), R172F (USAFT-41D and USAFT-41C), R172G (USAFT-41D), R172H (USAFT-41D), R172J, R172K, 172RG, 177, 177A, 177B, 177RG, 180, 180A, 180B, 180C, 180D, 180E, 180F, 180G, 180H, 180J, 180K, 182, 182A, 182B, 182C, 182D, 182E, 182F, 182G, 182H, 182J, 182K, 182L, 182M, 182N, 182P, 182Q, 182R, 182RG, T182, T182RG, T182R, 185, 185A, 185B, 185C, 185D, 185E, A185E, A185F, 188, 188A, 188B, A188, A188B, T188C, 206, P206, P206A, P206B, P206C, P206D, P206E, TP206A, TP206B, TP206C, TP206D, TP206E, U206-A, U206-B, U206-C, U206-D, U206-E, U206-F, U206-G, TU206-A, TU206-B, TU206-C, TU206-D, TU206-E, TU206-F, TU206-G, 207, 207A, T207, T207A, 210, 210A, 210B, 210C, 210D, 210E, 210F, 210-5 (205), 210-5A (205A), T210F, 210G, T-210G, 210H, T-210H, 210J, 205P, T-210J, 210K, T-210K, T210L, 210L, 210M, T210M, 210N, P210N, T210N, 205T, 210R, P210R, 205U, T210R, 210-5, 210-5A, 305A (USAF 0-1A), 305C (USAF 0-1E), 305D (USAF 0-1F), 305F, 305B (USAF T0-1D), 305E (0-1D or 0-1F), and 321 (Navy 0E-2).
SA2163NM	Cessna Model U206G.
SA2164NM	Cessna Model 180Q.
SA2166NM	Cessna Model 177.
SA2167NM	The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models L-14, PA-12, PA-12S, PA-14, PA-15, PA-16, PA-16S, PA-17, PA-18, PA-18A, PA-18S, PA-18-105 (Special), PA-18S-105(SP), PA-18-125 (Army L-21A), PA-18AS-125, PA-18S-125, PA-18-135, PA-18A-135, PA-18AS-135, PA-18S-135, PA-18-150, PA-18A-150, PA-18AS-150, PA-18S-150, PA-19 (Army L-18C), PA-19S, PA-20, PA-20S, PA-20-115, PA-20S-115, PA-20-135, PA-22, PA-22-108, PA-22-135, PA-22S-135, PA-22-150, PA-22S-150, PA-22-160, PA-22S-160, PA-24, PA-24-250, PA-24-260, PA-24-400, PA-25, PA-25-235, PA-25-260, PA-32-260, PA-32RT-300, PA-32RT-301T, PA-32-300, PA-32RT-300T, PA-32-301, PA-32S-300, PA-32R-301, PA-32-301T, PA-32R-300, PA-32R-301T, PA-28-140, PA-28-141, PA-28-150, PA-28-151, PA-28-160, PA-28S-160, PA-28-180, PA-28R-180, PA-28S-180, PA-28-235, PA-28S-235, PA-28-181, PA-28-161, PA-28R-200, PA-28R-201, PA-28R-201T, PA-28-236, PA-28RT-201, PA-28RT-201T, PA-28-201T, PA-36-285, PA-36-300, PA-36-375, PA-38-112, and PA-46-310P.
SA2168NM	Mooney Models M20, M20A, M20B, M20C, M20D, M20E, M20F, M20G, M20J, M20K, M20M, and M22.
SA2683NM	Aerocar, Inc. Model I.

Affected STC	Make and model airplanes
	<p> Aerodifusion, S.L. Model Jodel D-1190S. Aeromere, S.A. Model Falco F.8.L. Aeronautica Macchi S.P.A. Models AL60, AL60-B, AL60-F5, and AL60-C5. Aeronautica Macchi & Aerfer Model AM-3. Aeronca Inc. Models 15AC and S15AC. Aerospatiale Model TB20 Trinidad. Arctic Aircraft Co., Inc. Models S-1A, S-1A-65F, S-1A-85F, S-1A-90F, S-1B1(Army L-67 XL-6), and S-1B2. Avions Mudry et Cie Model CAP 10B. American Champion Models (Bellanca, Aeronca) 7AC, 7ACA, S7AC (L-16A), 7BCM (L-16B), 7CCM, 7DC, S7DC, 7EC, S7EC, 7ECA, 7FC, 7GC, 7GCA, 7GCCA, 7GCB, 7GCB, 7GCBC, 7HC, 7JC, 7KC, 7KCAB, 8KCAB, 8GCBC, 11AC, S11AC, 11BC, S11BC, 11CC, and S11CC. Bellanca Aircraft Corporation Models 14-9, 14-9L, 14-12F-3, 14-13, 14-13-2, 14-13-3, 14-13-3W, 14-19, 14-19-2, 14-19-3A, 17-30, 17-31, 17-31TC, 17-30A, 17-31A, and 17-31ATC. Biemond, C. Model Teal CB1. Board, G.R. Models Columbia XJL-1 and Bolkow Jr. Clark Aircraft, Inc. Models 12 and 1000. Falcon Aircraft Corporation Model F-1. Flug und Fahrzeugwerke AG Model AS 202/15 "Brand". Found Brothers Model FBA-2C Fuji Heavy Industries Models FA-200-160, FA-200-180, and FA-200-180AO. Funk Aircraft Model Funk C. Kearns, Edward Scott (Garcia, Henry S.) Model (Emigh) Trojan A-2. Swift Museum Foundation, Inc. Model (Globe) GC-1A, GC-1B. Goodyear Aircraft Model GA-22A. Great Lakes Aircraft Model 2T-1A-1 and 2T-1A-2. Grumman American Models G-164, G-164A, G-164B, AA-1, AA-1A, AA-1B, AA-1C, AA-5, AA-5A, and AA-5B. Commander Aircraft (Gulfstream) Models 112, (112A, 112B, 112TC, 112TCA, 114, and 114A. Helio Enterprises Models H-250, H-295 (USAF U-10D), H-391 (USAF YL-24), H-395 (SAF L-28A), H-395A, HT-295, and H-700. Prop-Jets, Inc. (Interceptor Corp., Aero Commander, Meyers) Models 200, 200A, 200B, 200C, and 200D. C. Itoh Aircraft Maintenance & Engineering Co. LTD. Model N-62. Jamieson Corporation Model J-2-L1B. Jodel, Avion Models D-140-B, DR-1050, D-1190, and 150. Lake Models C-1, C-2-IV, LA-4, LA-4-200, and LA-4-250. Luscombe Aircraft Corp. Models 8, 8A, 8B, 8C, 8D, 8E, 8F, T-8F, and 11A. Maule Aerospace Technology Corp. Models Bee Dee M-4, M-4, M-4C, M-4S, M-4T, M-4-180C, M-4-180S, M-4-210, M-4-201C, M-4-210S, M-4-210T, M-4-220S, M-4-220T, M-5-180C, M-5-200, M-5-210C, M-5-210TC, M-T-220C, M-5-235, M-5-235C, M-6-180, M-6-235, M-7-235, MX-7-180, MX-7-235. Messerschmitt-Bolkow Models BO-209-150. FV&RV, BO209-160 FV&RV, BO-209, and 150OFF. Nardi S.A. Model FN-333. Jimmie Thompson Enterprise (Navion Rangemaster Aircraft Corporation) Models Navion (L-17A). Navion A (L-17B, L-17C), Navion B, D, E, F, G, and H. White International Ltd. Models (Pitts) S-1S, S-1T, S-2, and S-2A. Procaer S.P.A. Models F 15/B, F 15/C, and F 15/E. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (Rockwell) Models 111, 112, 112B, 112TC, 112TCA, and 114. Aermacchi S.p.A Models S.205, S.205-18F, S.205-18/R, S.205-20/F, S.205-20/R, S.205-22/R, S.208, S.208A, F.260, and F.260B. Socata Groupe Aerospatiale Models Rallye Series MS880B, MS885, MS892-A-150, MS892E-150, MS893A, MS893E, MS894A, MS894E, TB9, TB10, and TB21. Stinson Models 108-2 and 108-3. Sud Aviation Models Gardan GY.80-1500, GY.80-160, and GY.80-180. Taylorcraft Aircraft Company Models F19, F21, and F21A. Univair Aircraft Corporation (Forney) Models F-1, F-1A, (ERCO)E, 415D, (ALON)A-2, A20a, (Mooney)M10, (Mooney) (ERCO) 415-C, and 415-CD. Augustair, Inc. (Varga Aircraft Corporation) Models 2150, 2150A, and 2180. </p>

Note 1: The above list includes the aircraft where the Precise Flight, Inc. Model SVS III standby vacuum systems could be installed through STC. This list is not meant to be exhaustive nor does it include all aircraft with the systems installed through field approval.

Note 2: This AD applies to any aircraft with a standby vacuum system installed that is identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For aircraft that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated in the body of this AD, unless already accomplished.

To detect and correct problems with the standby vacuum system before failure or

malfunction and to provide operating procedures for the pilot regarding the use and limitations of this system, accomplish the following:

(a) Within the next 30 calendar days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish whichever (paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) below) of the following that applies:

(1) For airplanes with the affected standby vacuum system installed in accordance with the applicable STC, incorporate the applicable Precise Flight, Inc. Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) for Standby Vacuum Systems (each document corresponds with the applicable STC as

presented in the chart below) into the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), including installing all placards specified in these AFMS's; or insert a copy of the Appendix to this AD into the AFM, including installing all placards specified in the Appendix:

Applicable STC	AFMS Date
SA2160NM	May 7, 1998.
SA2161NM	August 6, 1998.
SA2162NM	August 6, 1998.
SA2163NM	August 6, 1998.
SA2164NM	August 6, 1998.
SA2166M	August 6, 1998.
SA2167NM	August 6, 1998.
SA2168NM	August 6, 1998.
SA2683NM	August 6, 1998; or.

(2) For airplanes with the affected standby vacuum system installed through field approval, insert the Appendix to this AD into the AFM, including installing all placards specified in the Appendix.

(b) Within the next 12 calendar months after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals specified in the following paragraphs, inspect the push-pull cable, vacuum lines, saddle fittings, and shuttle valve for correct installation and damage (wear, chafing, deterioration, etc.). Accomplish these inspections in accordance with Precise Flight Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (Section 3.3 of Installation Report No. 50050), Revision 25, dated August 26, 1996.

(1) Reinspect the push-pull cable, vacuum lines, and saddle fittings at intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months; and

(2) Reinspect the shuttle valve at intervals not to exceed 24 calendar months.

(c) Prior to further flight after each inspection required by paragraph (b) of this AD, accomplish the following in accordance with Precise Flight Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (Section 3.3 of Installation Report No. 50050), Revision 25, dated August 26, 1996.

(1) Correct any discrepancy found; and

(2) Conduct a function test of the vacuum system and assure proper function.

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the initial or repetitive compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue, SW, Renton, Washington 98055-4065. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(f) All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Precise Flight, Inc., 63120 Powell Butte Road, Bend, Oregon

97701; or may examine this/these document(s) at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

Appendix to Docket No. 98-CE-87-AD

System Description

A Precise Flight Standby Vacuum System may be installed to provide a temporary vacuum system in the event of a primary vacuum failure. The Standby Vacuum System operates on the differential between the intake manifold and ambient air pressure and is directed through a shuttle valve system to drive your flight instruments.

I. Operating Limitations

A. Instructions

1. The Standby Vacuum System is for emergency or standby use only and not for dispatch purposes.

2. Vacuum powered add/or Vacuum gyro directed autopilot operation may be unreliable when the Standby Vacuum System is the sole source of vacuum. Vacuum powered or vacuum gyro directed autopilot should be OFF when operating with a failed primary vacuum system.

3. The Supplemental Vacuum System is not designed to operate pneumatic de-ice systems. DO NOT operate a pneumatic de-ice system when operating with a failed primary vacuum system.

4. Above 10,000 ft. pressure altitude, engine power settings may have to be significantly reduced to provide adequate vacuum power for proper gyro instrument operation.

5. The following placards are required to be in full view of pilot:

B. Placards

Placard to be located on the push/pull control cable.

Placard to be located around the LED for the pump inop warning light.

Placard to be placed in front and in full view of the pilot.

STANDBY VACUUM SYSTEM EQUIPPED:
FOR OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS SEE SUPPLEMENT IN
OWNERS MANUAL OR PILOTS OPER-
ATING HANDBOOK

One of the following placards must be placed in full view of the pilot near the instrument vacuum indicator after appropriate entries have been made.

APPROXIMATE STANDBY VACUUM
AVAILABLE—ALTITUDE-POWER
CHART FOR AIRCRAFT WITH CON-
STANT SPEED PROPELLER—MAX-
IMUM CONTINUOUS RPM.

Press alt. (Ft.)	RPM	Man. pressure	SVS vacuum in Hg. Min.
2000	Max. Cont.		
4000	Max. Cont.		
6000	Max. Cont.		
8000	Max. Cont.		
10,000 ..	Max. Cont.		

APPROXIMATE STANDBY VACUUM
AVAILABLE—ALTITUDE-POWER
CHART FOR AIRCRAFT WITH A FIXED
PITCH PROPELLER

Press alt. (Ft.)	RPM	SVS vacuum in Hg min.
2000		
4000		
6000		
8000		
10,000		

II. Operating Procedures

A. Normal Procedures

1. Ground Check

a. Cycle the Standby Vacuum Control Knob Out—ON—, and return Control Knob IN—OFF—position.

2. Before Takeoff

a. Idle Engine at low speed, momentarily pull the standby vacuum knob out—ON— and check vacuum gauge. Normally, the vacuum reading will be slightly higher. After checking system push Standby Vacuum System knob IN—OFF—. Check that vacuum gauge has returned to the previous reading.

3. Enroute

a. Regularly check vacuum gauge and monitor warning light for proper vacuum system operation.

B. Emergency Procedures

1. Primary Vacuum Failure Warning Light Illuminates

a. Pull the Standby Vacuum System knob OUT -ON- and adjust throttle setting as required to maintain adequate vacuum for the primary instruments—Suction Gauge Reading in the Green Arc—If necessary descend to a lower altitude to obtain a larger differential between manifold and ambient pressure. Vacuum power must be closely monitored by checking the vacuum gauge frequently.

b. The SVS is not designed for continued IFR flight. Immediate steps should be taken to return to VFR conditions or to land. If this

is not possible, IFR flight should be continued only as long as necessary to return to VFR conditions or land the airplane.

WARNING: FAILURE OF THE VACUUM SYSTEM STILL CONSTITUTES AN EMERGENCY SITUATION REGARDLESS OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE SVS. IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN A SAFE ALTITUDE AND MAKE USE OF THE SVS. IN SUCH A SITUATION THE AIRPLANE MUST BE FLOWN USING NON-VACUUM POWERED INSTRUMENTS.

c. If descent is impractical:

- Periodically and temporarily reduce power as required to provide adequate vacuum to the aircraft primary instruments.
- Reapply power as required, while comparing vacuum driven gyros against the Turn and Bank Indicator, Turn Coordinator, VSI and/or other flight instruments.
- When an obvious discrepancy is noted between the vacuum driven instruments and other flight instrumentation. Periodically and temporarily reduce power as required to provide adequate vacuum to the aircraft primary instruments.

III. Performance

No change.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on June 25, 1999.

Michael Gallagher,

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 99-16911 Filed 7-6-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-SW-13-AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter France Model AS332C, L, and L1 Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Eurocopter France Model AS332C, L, and L1 helicopters. This proposal would require inspecting and replacing certain bolts that secure the hoist arm lower fitting. This proposal is prompted by a report of a failure of the bolts that secure the hoist arm lower fitting during a factory load test. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent failure of the bolts that secure the hoist arm lower fitting, separation of components from the helicopter, impact with the main or tail rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 7, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-SW-13-AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Mathias, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft Standards Staff, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137, telephone (817) 222-5123, fax (817) 222-5961.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. 99-SW-13-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-SW-13-AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

Discussion

The Direction Generale De L'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the airworthiness authority for France, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on Eurocopter France Model AS332C, L, and L1 helicopters. The DGAC advises of the failure during a load test of certain incorrect bolts that were used to secure the hoist arm lower fittings.

Eurocopter France has issued Telex No. 00069, dated November 3, 1998, for Model AS 332C, L, and L1 helicopters that are not modified in accordance with modification AMS 0722955 to inspect each bolt that secures the hoist arm lower fitting to ensure that the correct bolt, part number (P/N) 22201BE080020L, is installed rather than the incorrect bolt, P/N 22201BC080017L. The DGAC classified this Telex as mandatory and issued AD 98-487-072(A), dated December 2, 1998, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters in France.

These helicopter models are manufactured in France and are type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the DGAC, reviewed available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of these type designs that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other Eurocopter France Model AS332C, L, and L1 helicopters of the same type design registered in the United States, the proposed AD would require inspecting the bolts that secure the hoist arm lower fitting and replacing each incorrect bolt, P/N 22201BC080017L, with an airworthy bolt, P/N 22201BE080020L.

The FAA estimates that four helicopters of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 1.5 work hours to inspect and replace the bolts per helicopter, and that the average labor rate is \$60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately \$50 for four bolts. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$560.