For more detailed information on specific aspects of this Standard, contact Ray Sawyer by calling (703) 325–8625 or by writing to Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Room 856–C, Alexandria, VA 22331–0600.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Dating back to 1928 when Congress directed the Secretaries of the military departments to establish a joint board of officers to "keep informed on stored supplies of ammunition and components thereof * * *, with particular regard to keeping those supplies properly dispersed and stored and to preventing hazardous conditions from arising to endanger life and property inside or outside of storage reservations," the DDESB (formerly known as the Ammunition Safety Board) has periodically revised or updated the Standard based on new scientific or technical information and explosives safety experience. The implementation of a change to DoD 6055.9-STD does not depend on formal publication of a change to DoD 6055.9-STD. Changes to the Standard are effective when adopted by the Board, or as the Board may otherwise direct. In order to ensure compliance, the Services and Defense Agencies modify their Service or Agency implementing procedures and standards accordingly.

This revision to the October 1992 version of DoD 6055.9–STD incorporates decisions of the DDESB made at its 307th through 314th meetings held from July 1992 through February 1997. Although the decisions adopted at the 307th meeting of the Board in July 1992 pre-date the October 1992 publication, the Standard was already at the printer and those changes could not be included. This revision also reflects the recent assignment of the DDESB to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

The changes included herein address the following:

• Expands the Scope of the Standard to include application to any energetic material (U.S. titled or otherwise) on DoD owned or leased facilities.

• Eliminates high explosives limits for training military working dogs for explosives detection and maintains evacuation distances applicable to personnel who are not involved in the training activity.

• Establishes quantity-distance criteria for non-essential personnel and establishes protection level criteria for essential personnel for use at ammunition and explosives burning sites. • Expands and clarifies quantitydistance criteria for the location of steel tanks used to store hazardous materials or water with respect to ammunition and explosives locations.

• Establishes criteria for sites where explosives loaded containers may be moved from a rail to a road transport mode, and vice versa.

• Modifies lightning protection criteria into performance oriented criteria that are consistent with current National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards.

• Establishes criteria that apply to locations where inhabited building quantity-distance arcs are allowed to extend beyond DoD boundary lines.

• Clarifies the application of explosion propagation prevention measures when storing Storage Compatibility Groups B and F ammunition with other compatibility groups ammunition.

• Expands the exemption from quantity-distance requirements for specific combat aircraft weapons loads.

• Establishes quantity-distance criteria for Navy Maritime Prepositioning Ships based on test results for specific ship explosives load configurations.

• Expands and clarifies the standards applicable to real property containing ammunition, explosives, or chemical agents, including providing for specified depth criteria in the absence of a sitespecific assessment.

• Specifies the conditions that would allow limited opening of boxes loaded with ammunition while inside storage facilities.

• Clarifies the quantity-distance criteria applicable to training facilities occupied by military personnel.

• Clarifies the criteria for types of ammunition and inert materials that may be stored in modular storage units and sets explosives limits for modular storage cells.

• Based upon tests results and analysis, reduces the quantity-distance criteria for U.S. 3rd generation harden aircraft shelters.

• Allows commanders to determine the appropriate separation distances between aircraft parking areas, combat aircraft parking areas, the associated ready ammunition storage facilities, and ammunition cargo areas.

• Based upon test results, clarifies the criteria used to satisfy the quantity-distance requirements for underground ammunition and explosives storage facilities.

• Establishes requirement to retain the explosives facility site plan package at the installation. • Establishes quantity-distance criteria for siting range control points with respect to other potential explosion sites.

• Expands and clarifies quantitydistance criteria to include separation of combat- and explosives-loaded aircraft from taxiways and runways.

• Revises the definitions and quantity-distance requirements, particularly inter-magazine separation requirements, for earth covered magazines.

• Clarifies the requirements for location of overhead electric services lines with respect to ammunition and explosives facilities.

• Expands and clarifies the requirements for transporting materials contaminated with chemical agents.

• Clarifies the criteria for containers that may be used to monitor protective clothing that may be used in chemical agent areas.

• Modifies public traffic route distance criteria by expanding traffic density evaluations to include rail and ship traffic, basing density on passengers per day, and providing guidance for evaluating traffic density to clarify the use of minimum fragment distances.

• Corrects inconsistencies with current Hazard Division 1.6 ammunition criteria, and harmonizes U.S. criteria with NATO criteria.

• Establishes criteria applicable to the use of revetments to separate ammunition stored on pads or hung on aircraft.

In adopting these changes, the DDESB has determined that the Standards, as changed, are at least as protective as the previous Standards.

Dated: November 20, 1997.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense. [FR Doc. 97–30996 Filed 11–25–97; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5000–04–M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 98-20]

36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense. **ACTION:** Notice.

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of P.L. 104–164 dated 21 July 1996.

63078

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. J. Hurd, DSAA/COMPT/RM, (703) 604–6575.

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 98–20, with attached transmittal, policy justification and sensitivity of technology pages.

Dated: November 20, 1997.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

BILLING CODE 5000-04-M



DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

() y NUV 1997 In reply refer to: I-55236/97

Honorable Newt Gingrich Speaker of the House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515-6501

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 98-20, concerning the Department of the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Korea for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$109 million. Soon after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

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MICHAEL S. DAVISON, JR. LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA DIRECTOR

Attachments

Transmittal No. 98-20

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

(i) **Prospective Purchaser:** Korea

(ii)	Total Estimated Value:	
	Major Defense Equipment*	\$ 88 million
	Other	\$ 21 million
	TOTAL	\$ 109 million

- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: Three MK 41 Vertical Launch Systems, 144 MK 13 MOD 0 canisters, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, personnel training and training equipment, support and test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, launch system software development and maintenance and other related elements of logistics support.
- (iv) Military Department: Navy (LOW)
- (v) <u>Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to</u> be Paid: none
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex attached.
- (vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 09 NOV 1997
- * as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Korea - MK 41 Vertical Launch Systems

The Government of Korea has requested the possible sale of three MK 41 Vertical Launch Systems, 144 MK 13 MOD 0 canisters, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, personnel training and training equipment, support and test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, launch system software development and maintenance and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$109 million.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in Northeast Asia.

The missile launchers will be installed on new construction frigates and are intended for use with STANDARD missiles as the principal air defense armament of these new vessels. Korea will have no difficulty absorbing this missile launch systems into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this shipboard missile launch systems and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin Aero and Naval Systems, Baltimore, Maryland. One or more proposed offset agreements may be related to this proposed sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any contractor representatives in Korea; however, there will be three U.S. Government personnel for approximately 39 months during the preparation, equipment installations, and equipment test and checkout of the MK 41 Vertical Launch Systems on the ships.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 98-20

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer-Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vi

(vi) <u>Sensitivity of Technology</u>:

1. The MK-41 Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) contains sensitive technology and is Unclassified. The launch control computer program, which also contains missile launch rates, is classified Confidential. Sections of the MK-41 technical documentation, which disclose launcher vulnerabilities, are classified Confidential.

2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of this system, it is possible that countermeasures could be developed to reduce its effectiveness.

3. A determination has been made that Korea can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

[FR Doc. 97–30983 Filed 11–25–97; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5000–04–C